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I argue that savant skills arelatentinusall. Myhypothesis is that savants have privileged access to lower
level, less-processed information, before it is packaged into holistic concepts and meaningful labels.
Owing to a failure in top-down inhibition, they can tap into information that exists in all of our brains,
but is normally beyond conscious awareness. This suggests why savant skills might arise spontaneously
in otherwise normal people, and why such skills might be artiﬁcially induced by low-frequency
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. It also suggests why autistic savants are atypically literal
with a tendency to concentrate more on the parts than on the whole and why this offers advantages for
particular classes of problem solving, such as those that necessitate breaking cognitive mindsets.
A strategy of building from the parts to the whole could form the basis for the so-called autistic genius.
Unlike the healthy mind, which has inbuilt expectations of the world (internal order), the autistic mind
must simplify the world by adopting strict routines (external order).
Keywords: autism; Asperger syndrome; savant skills; exceptional talent; privileged access;
transcranial magnetic stimulation
1. INTRODUCTION
My intention here is to propose an explanation for
savant skills and to explore the possibility of artiﬁcially
inducing such skills in healthy, normal individuals.
This gives insights into the architecture of the healthy
mind, especially why certain abilities are deliberately
inhibited from conscious awareness. I suggest that the
savant condition occurs as a failure of this top-down
inhibition process. To set the stage, I argue in §2 that
savant skills are latent in us all.
The savant syndrome is a rare condition in which
persons with autistic disorder or other mental dis-
abilities have extraordinary skills that stand in stark
contrast to their overall handicap. Savant skills are
typically conﬁned to ﬁve areas: art, music, calendar
calculating, mathematics and mechanical/spatial skills
(Treffert 2005). These skills are accompanied by an
exceptional ability to recall meaningless detail—
memory without understanding (Sacks 2007)a n da
high incidence of absolute pitch (AP) and synaesthesia.
Snyder & Mitchell (1999) argued that all savant
skills, including AP and synaesthesia, reside within
everyone, but that they are not normally accessible to
conscious awareness. Owing to some atypical brain
function, savants have privileged access to raw, less-
processed information—information in some interim
state before it is packaged into holistic labels. This
privileged access facilitates a distinct literal cognitive
style in which a person thinks in detail, working from
the parts to the whole (De Clercq 2003). Savant skills
are a form of reproduction. Savants access or read off
something that exists in all of our brains, but is
normally inaccessible through introspection (Snyder &
Mitchell 1999). The precise neuroanatomical
mechanism for gaining this privileged access is not yet
resolved. It may be associated with an atypical
hemispheric imbalance wherein concept networks are
bypassed or inhibited.
Accordingly, it was predicted (Snyder, in Carter
1999) and subsequently shown (Snyder et al. 2003,
2006; Young et al. 2004; Gallate et al. 2009) that
savant-like skills can sometimes be artiﬁcially induced
in normal healthy individuals by inhibiting part of the
brain—the left anterior temporal lobe (LATL). This is
consistent with the notion that autistic savants have
some atypical left brain dysfunction or inhibition
together with right brain compensation (Miller et al.
1998; Treffert 2005; Sacks 2007). In addition, this
explanation would appear to ﬁt with contemporary
views on hemispheric competition and how disinhibit-
ing the non-dominant hemisphere can artiﬁcially offset
such competition (Hilgetag et al. 2001). It possibly also
explains the right-hemispheric bias sometimes associ-
ated with autism and other pathologies (§4, below). In
other words, everyone has the raw information for
savant skills, but it requires a form of cortical
disinhibition or atypical hemispheric imbalance to be
accessed. As I discuss below, there are various factors
that could facilitate this disinhibition.
Apart from attempting to demonstrate that savant
skills exist in everyone, there is an additional reason for
attempting to artiﬁcially induce the savant-like state.
Savant skills are normally not creative, being largely
imitative.Nonetheless,bybeingatypically literal, witha
tendency to concentrate more on the parts than on the
whole, a person sees the world in a less-biased light.
Suchacognitivestrategyoffersadvantagesforparticular
classesofproblemsolving,suchasthosethatnecessitate
breaking cognitive illusions. A strategy of building from
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so-called autistic genius (Snyder 2004), and provide
hints for avenues to artiﬁcially enhance creativity as has
been discussed elsewhere (Snyder et al. 2004).
2. SAVANT SKILLS LATENT IN EVERYONE?
We have argued that savants have privileged access to
lower level, less-processed information, before it is
packaged into holistic concepts and labels—savants tap
into or read off information that exists in all of our
brains; but this information is normally beyond
conscious awareness owing to top-down inhibition
(Snyder & Mitchell 1999; Snyder et al. 2004).
This is supported by powerful arguments: those who
have protracted experience with savants say that their
‘gift springs so to speak from the ground, unbidden,
apparently untrained and at the age of somewhere
between 5 and 8 years of age. There is often no family
history of the talent’ and it ‘is apparently not improved
by practice’ (O’Connor 1989, p. 4). ‘The core ability
behind the skill emerges spontaneously and does not
improve qualitatively with time even though it
might become better articulated’ (O’Connor 1989).
In addition, the talents are largely imitative.
If these skills are not latent, it would appear highly
coincidental that such a peculiar subset of abilities
should be so compelling to a signiﬁcant fraction of
savants across all cultures and also that many of these
same savants simultaneously have several savant skills
(Rimland & Fein 1988), each of which are similarly
peculiar and restricted. Furthermore, autistic savant
skills are known to recede or be lost altogether with
maturity (Selfe 1977; Barnes & Earnshaw 1995;
Treffert 2006).
Savants cannot normally give insights into how they
perform their skill and are uncontaminated by learnt
algorithms. It just comes to them. They just see it. With
maturity, the occasionally offered insights are suspect,
possibly being contaminated by the acquisition of
concepts concerning the particular skill. Yet, I have
labelled one savant, Daniel Tammet, a Rosetta stone
(Johnson 2005).
By far, the most compelling argument for savant
skills residing equally within everyone is that they can
emerge ‘suddenly and spontaneously’ (Miller et al.
2000, p. 86) in individuals who had no prior history for
them, either in interest, ability or talent (Treffert 2006;
Sacks 2007, pp. 157 and 313). Striking examples
include skills in art, music (Sacks 2007), mathematics
(Treffert 2006, p. 85), calendar calculating (LaFay
1987; Osborne 2003) and possibly AP (Zatorre 1989,
see p. 573). The same appears to hold for synaesthesia
(Sacks 2007, p. 180), as theory suggested (Snyder &
Mitchell 1999), which is reported frequently by autistic
savants (Heaton et al. 1998; Sacks 2007; Tammet
2007, 2009). Furthermore, these acquired savant skills
have been known to diminish with recovery from illness
(Sacks 2007, p. 315).
Acquired savants arise from a variety of causes
(Treffert 2006) including left frontotemporal dementia
(Miller et al. 1998), physical injury to the left temporal
lobe (LaFay 1987; J. Hirsch & A. Snyder 2005,
personal communication), left hemispheric strokes
(Sacks 2007, p. 315), severe illness to the central
nervous system (Treffert 2006) and even when under
the inﬂuence of hallucinogens (Humphrey 2002; Sacks
2007, p. 181).
3. INDUCING SAVANT SKILLS ARTIFICIALLY
Taken together, the above facts argue persuasively that
savant skills reside within us all and that they can be
rapidly switched on and off by natural causes. But, can
they be induced temporarily by artiﬁcial means?
‘Although we do not normally have access to lower
levels of information as do savants, is there nonetheless
some artiﬁcial means to promote this access’ (Snyder &
Mitchell 1999), say, by inhibiting part of the brain with
magnetic pulses to inhibit top-down inhibition?
(see Snyder’s suggestion in Carter 1999).
There are now several accounts of artiﬁcially
induced savant-like skills, in drawing, proofreading,
numerosity and false memory reduction, all by
inhibiting the LATL with repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS; Snyder et al. 2003,
2006; Young et al. 2004; Gallate et al. 2009).
Low-frequency rTMS temporarily inhibits neural
activity in a localized area of the cerebral cortex,
thereby creating ‘virtual lesions’ (Hilgetag et al. 1999;
Walsh & Cowey 2000; Hoffman & Cavus 2002;
Steven & Pascual-Leone 2006). As discussed below in
§4, the LATL is implicated in the savant syndrome for
both autistic savants as well as savants who emerge late
in life as a result of frontotemporal lobe dementia
(Miller et al. 1998, 2000; Hou et al. 2000).
(a) Induced drawing skills
We cannot draw naturalistic scenes unlessweare taught
tricks (Gombrich 1960). This is surprising because our
brains obviously possess all of the necessary visual
information required to draw, but we are apparently
unable to consciously access it for the purpose of
drawing (Snyder & Thomas 1997; Snyder & Mitchell
1999). Unlike artistic savants (Selfe 1977; Wiltshire
1987; Miller et al. 1998), we tend to be more aware of
the meaningful whole than its constituent parts.
Snyder et al. (2003) directed low-frequency rTMS
for 15 min over the LATL of 11, right-handed, healthy
participants. The participants were given 1 min to draw
a dog, horse or face from memory, before, during,
immediately after and 45 min after rTMS treatment.
Magnetic stimulation caused a major change in the
schema of the drawings of 4 out of 11 participants. Two
of these also underwent sham (inactive) stimulation
either the week before or after the real test. The
changes in drawing style were observed only following
active stimulation and not after sham stimulation. In
some cases, the drawings returned to ‘normal’ 45 min
after rTMS ceased. Young et al. (2004) also reported
rTMS-enhanced drawing skills.
Several participants reported greater awareness of
detail in their surrounds after active rTMS. One
participant published his experience, stating that he
‘could hardly recognize the drawings as his own even
though he had watched himself render each image’.
(Osborne 2003, p. 38).
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It is easy to miss errors of writing in a familiar passage.
Presumably, our propensity to impose meaning inhibits
our awareness for the details that comprise the meaning
(Bartlett 1932). So, in an attempt to artiﬁcially induce
autistic-like literalness, Snyder et al. (2003) had the
above 11 participants undergo a test for proofreading
following the same rTMS protocol. Without rTMS,
participants almost always missed a duplicated
word, such as ‘the’ in familiar proverbs, even after
multiple exposures.
Two participants displayed a noticeable improve-
ment in their ability to recognize duplicated words in
text following stimulation. They did comparatively well
during and/or immediately after stimulation and
comparatively poorly both before and 45 min after.
Importantly, these two participants also displayed
pronounced style changes in their drawings during
and after real stimulation but not after placebo
stimulation. None of the participants improved at
proofreading with placebo stimulation.
In conclusion, low-frequency rTMS of the left
frontotemporal lobe caused major changes in the
schema of drawings for 4 out of 11 participants, 2 of
whom signiﬁcantly improved at proofreading.
(c) Induced numerosity
It is not possible to accurately estimate a large number
of objects without counting them successively. A small
number, three or four, can be accessed (Jevons 1871).
Yet, there have been reports over time about the ability
of autistic savants to accurately guess large numbers of
objects (Scripture 1891; Sacks 1986; Treffert 2006).
For instance, Sacks (1986) observed autistic twins who
instantly guessed the exact number of match sticks that
had just fallen on the ﬂoor, saying in unison ‘111’.
Such reports motivated Snyder et al. (2006) to
induce savant-like numerosity abilities in 12 right-
handed participants.
Low-frequency rTMS was applied to the LATL for
15 min (Snyder et al. 2006). Participants were pre-
sented with between 50 and 150 discrete elements on
a monitor with rTMS and sham stimulation. Each
session involved 60 trials, that is 20 opportunities to
guess the number of elements before, immediately after
and 1 hour after rTMS. The exposure time was 1.5 s:
too short for anyone to count the number of elements,
but sufﬁciently long to resemble exposure times in real-
life situations (ﬁgure 1).
Out of 12 participants, 10 improved their ability to
accurately guess the number of discrete elements
immediately following magnetic pulse stimulation.
Out of these 10 participants, 8 became worse 1 hour
later, as the effects of the magnetic pulses receded.
None of those eight participants exhibited that pattern
during the sham session. The probability of as many as
8 out of 12 people doing the best just after rTMS and
not just after the sham by chance alone is less than 1 in
1000 (pZ0.001; ﬁgure 2).
(i) Why does becoming more literal enhance numerosity?
We argue that the estimation of number by normal
people is performed on information after it has been
processed into meaningful patterns. The meaning we
unconsciously assign to these patterns interferes with
our accuracy of estimation, whereas savants, by virtue
of being literal, have less interference.
This is consistent with the fact that the accuracy of
estimating numbers of elements depends on their
arrangement (Ginsburg 1976, 1991; Dehaene
1997)—‘perceived numerosity depends more on higher
level cognitive factors. than on lower level perceptual
or sensory factors’. (Krueger 1984, p. 540).
This insight has an important generalization. The
healthy brain makes hypotheses in order to extract
meaning from the sensory input, hypotheses derived
from prior experience (Gregory 1970, 2004; Snyder &
Barlow 1988; Snyder et al. 2004). So judgements in
general are likely to be performed on this hypothesized
content, not on the actual raw sensory input. This
suggests the possibility of artiﬁcially reducing certain
types of false memories and prejudice by making a
person more literal, as well as enhancing creativity
(Snyder et al. 2004).
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Figure 2. Mean ability across all participants to make guesses
within the bulls-eye criterion of 5 with (a) TMS and (b) sham.
Shows numerosity performance before (pre), immediately
after (post) and 1 hour after rTMS. Error bars represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals and 99% of estimates were multiples of
ﬁve (from Snyder et al. 2004).
Figure 1. TMS set-up for the numerosity experiment.
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It is well known that our memories are not literal
representations of the past. Instead, ‘facts’ are uncon-
sciously constructed to ﬁt our schemata (Loftus 2003;
Schacter & Addis 2007). Yet, certain pathologies,
including autism and anterior temporal lobe (ATL)
dementia (Beversdorf et al. 2000; Simons et al. 2005;
Hillier et al. 2007), can lead to literal recall and thus
greater resistance to false memories.
This inspired Gallate et al. (2009) to reduce false
memories by temporarily inhibiting the LATL in 14
normal participants, using low-frequency magnetic
pulse stimulation. The false memory paradigm of
Roediger & McDermott (1995) was adopted, with
stimulation applied between the study and test phases
of the task.
After stimulation, participants had 36 per cent
fewer false memories and intact veridical memory, a
result that is comparable with the improvement that
people with autism and semantic dementia show over
normal individuals.
4. THE ROLE OF THE LEFT ANTERIOR
TEMPORAL LOBE IN THE SAVANT SYNDROME
Why did we apply rTMS to the LATL? The savant
syndrome is often associated with some form of left
brain dysfunction together with right brain compen-
sation, leading to a predilection for literal, non-symbolic
skills (Sacks 2007, pp. 314–315; Treffert 2005, 2006).
This is consistent with the role of the left hemisphere in
hypothesis formation: the left, but not the right, hemi-
sphere tends to search for patterns, and match them to
prior experience (Wolford et al.2 0 0 0 ). Furthermore,
most savants are autistic and autism has sometimes
been associated with a right-hemispheric bias (Herbert
et al. 2005; Koshino et al. 2005) and a left hemisphere
dysfunction (Wilson et al.2 0 0 7 ).
The LATL has been speciﬁcally implicated in the
savant syndrome, both for an autistic savant as well as
for individuals who become savants at the onset of
frontotemporal dementia (FTD; Miller et al. 1998,
2000; Hou et al. 2000). Patients with FTD displayed
autistic savant-like artistic skills where none existed,
along with other autistic traits such as preoccupation
with visual details and a loss of semantic memory.
Miller et al. (1998) conclude that, ‘loss of function in
the LATL may lead to “paradoxical functional
facilitation” of artistic and musical skills’.
Compelling evidence also exists for the ATL as the
critical substrate for semantic representation, encom-
passing the memory and meaning of all types of verbal
and non-verbal stimuli—words, pictures, objects and
faces (Pobric et al. 2007). The LATL is especially vital
for semantic processing, implicated as the region
responsible for conceptual knowledge, labels and
categories (Miller et al. 1998; Mummery et al. 2000;
Thompson et al. 2003; Gainotti 2007; Noppeney et al.
2007; Olson et al. 2007).
When the LATL is damaged, patients lose their
semantic memory and their ability to name or label
objects, while retaining the ability to recall object
details (Mummery et al. 2000; Gainotti 2007). Oliveri
et al. (2004) found that participants were less accurate
in interpreting the meaning of opaque idioms (they
became more literal) after rTMS to the left temporal
lobe. Finally, the core features of semantic dementia
have been induced by inhibiting the LATL with rTMS.
Inhibition of LATL in normal participants can
temporarily lead to semantic impairment in picture
and word comprehension tasks, mimicking symptoms
of semantic dementia—‘with impairment to the ATL,
core semantic representations become degraded and
patients are unable to activate all of the information
associated with a concept’ (Pobric et al.2 0 0 7 ,
p. 20 139).
5. WHY rTMS IMPROVES A PERSON’S
SAVANT-LIKE ABILITY?
It is interesting to speculate on how rTMS, or damage
to the LATL, could give rise to savant-like skills. One
theory is that, in the normal brain, the conceptual
networks (concerned with meaning and labels) tend to
inhibit networks concerned with detail (Snyder et al.
2004). By inhibiting these networks, we may
facilitate conscious access to literal details, leading to
savant-like skills.
By obscuring the meaning of something, we become
more aware of the details that comprise it. It is easier to
draw a face if its meaning is suppressed, for example, by
turning the face upside down (Edwards 1989).
Inhibiting concept networks could disinhibit networks
that are receptive to novel detail, as foreshadowed by
Kapur (1996), Miller et al. (2000) and Hilgetag et al.
(2001). Both hemispheres contribute to semantic
memory, but the right hemisphere appears to have a
greater role in novel meanings (Goldberg 2005; Goel
et al. 2007; Sacks 2007, p. 155; Pobric et al. 2008).
The possibility that cortical areas responsible for
concepts could inhibit those concerned with detail is
consistent with top-down processing (Summerﬁeld et al.
2006; Furl et al. 2007) and with evidence about
hemispheric competition (Kapur 1996; Miller et al.
2000; Sacks 2007,p .1 5 5 ) ,a si sa l s ot h ep o s s i b i l i t yo f
reversing the inhibition by suppressing the dominant
cortical area with rTMS (Oliveri et al. 1999, 2004;
Hilgetagetal.2001;Theoretetal.2003;Sacketal.2005).
In particular, Hilgetag et al. (2001) concluded that
‘competition between different brain structures might,
thus,beageneralprincipleofbrainfunction(Walshetal.
1998) and may explain the paradoxical behavioural
enhancement or recovery observed after various brain
lesions’ (Kapur 1996; Hilgetag et al.1 9 9 9 ).
6. DISCUSSION
I have argued that the extraordinary skills of savants are
latent in us all and that they can be induced artiﬁcially
owing to the inhibiting inﬂuence of low-frequency
rTMS, that is, by turning off part of the brain, not by
exciting it. My hypothesis is that savant skills are
facilitated by privileged access to raw, less-processed
sensory information, information that exists in all brains
but is inaccessible owing to top-down inhibition. Thus,
autistic savants tend to see a more literal, less ﬁltered
view of the world. Their ‘skill’ or performance does not
depend on active learning, but simply on an effortless
‘reading off’ of this less-processed information.
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consequence of privileged access. AP is another.
Although weall havethe necessary frequency analysers,
AP cannot be learned and yet it is common among
savants. The same goes for naturalistic drawing skills,
for recall of seemingly meaningless details and for other
savant performance (Snyder & Mitchell 1999).
Finally, it should be said that our ‘privileged access’
hypothesis remains to be proven. The empirical
evidence so far, while consistent with the hypothesis,
is preliminary and requires independent researchers to
replicate the ﬁndings. In this regard, there are many
factors that could frustrate attempts to artiﬁcially
induce savant skills with low-frequency rTMS
(e.g. see Robertson et al. 2003). This could in part
explain why savant skills are not induced uniformly in
everyone. Furthermore, networks in addition to those
of the LATL may be implicated.
Why are savant skills suppressed in normal individ-
uals? And, why is it that all autistic individuals are
not savants?
(a) Why are savant skills normally suppressed?
If we all have latent savant skills, why are they not
normally accessible? Perhaps they are deliberately
inhibited as a principle of economy—object attributes
are inhibited from conscious awareness once a label
(concept) is formed (Snyder et al. 2004). After all, it is
the object label or its symbolic identiﬁcation that is of
ultimate importance and not the actual attributes
derived by the brain to formulate the label (Snyder &
Barlow 1998; Snyder & Mitchell 1999). There is no
need to be consciously aware of such details, which
explains why we cannot draw natural scenes without
being taught the tricks to do so. This strategy
accelerates decision-making, especially when con-
fronted with only partial information (Snyder et al.
2004). It might also accelerate the process of learning
because, without grouping information into mean-
ingful packets, the brain is overwhelmed (Seidenberg
et al. 2002).
(b) Why are all autistic people not savants?
The majority of savants are autistic. Why not all?
Autistic spectrum disorders encompass a hugely
diverse population. However, it may well be that
autistic savants represent autism in its purest form,
uncontaminated by learned algorithms and other
disorders that are frequently associated with autism.
In other words, autistic savants typify an idealized, pure
autism, most closely identiﬁed with Kanner’s (1943)
infantile autism—a mind in a protracted state of
infancy (Snyder et al. 2004), a preconceptual mind
that thinks in detail, rather than through concepts. This
oversimplifying caricature goes some way to explain
why all autistic people are not savants.
(c) Privileged access: a unifying theory
of autism?
The label weak coherence (Happe ´ & Frith 2006) and/
or lacking theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985)
aptly captures a collection of autistic traits that were
ﬁrst introduced by Kanner (1943)—the what of
autism—but they do not provide an explanation for
the why of autism. I suggest that the state of pure
(infantile) autism is a failure in the process of concept
formation, and its associated top-down inhibition of
attributes that comprise concepts, which may offer a
mechanism that could unite the present descriptive
theories. We have access to models of the world
(‘mindsets’ or mental templates) that embody the
familiar. These allow us to manoeuvre rapidly when
confronted with only partial information. Concepts
order the world internally. Without them, order must
be imposed externally, hence the imposition of rigid
routines that characterizes infantile autism.
(d) Autistic genius: a consequence of
privileged access?
A fundamental bottleneck to creativity is our inability to
join the dots up in novel ways. We have a predisposition
to impose prior connections (§3c above). But, creativity
would seem torequire thatwe,atleast momentarily, free
ourselves of previous interpretations. Such literalness is
a consequence of privileged access and thus gives
insights into the so-called autistic genius (Snyder
2004) as well as hints to artiﬁcially enhance creativity
(Snyder et al.2 0 0 4 ).
The classical portrait of autism is that of rigid
insistence on sameness, rote memory and signiﬁcant
learning disabilities. Even autistic savants are the
antithesis of creative, being largely imitative: ‘there
are no savant geniuses about. Their mental limi-
tations disallow and preclude an awareness of innova-
tive developments’. (Hermelin 2001, p. 177).
Are there instances when privileged access facilitates
the creative process? Asperger (1944/1991) spoke of
autistic intelligence as being the intelligence of true
creativity, adding that it seems that for success in
science or art, a dash of autism is essential. And,
according to Fitzgerald (2004), a number of intellec-
tual giants had autistic traits.
The fact that genius might fall within the autistic
spectrum challenges our deepest notions of creativity.
Are there radically different routes to creativity: normal
and autistic? The autistic mind builds from the parts to
the whole—a strategy ideally suited to working within a
closed system of speciﬁed rules. By contrast, the
‘healthy’ mind appears to make unexpected connec-
tions between seemingly disparate systems, inventing
entire new systems rather than ﬁnding novelty within a
previously prescribed space (Snyder 2004).
I thank Sophie Ellwood, Roy Roring and Ben Doolan for their
insights.
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